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RECENT DECISIONS
Right to Hearing Upon Extension of Probation-Cook v. Com-
monvwealth
Aside from the fact that its use was originally limited and random in
nature, the historical origin of the probation process is uncertain. Revo-
lutionary changes in the theories controlling the treatment of convicted
criminals, however, has resulted in the development of probation into
the most widely used form of correctional treatment.1 With the emer-
gence of the probation process there has developed considerable con-
troversy over the procedural and evidentiary safeguards to be afforded
the probationer threatened with revocation of his conditional freedom.'
I See Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View From
Mempa v. Rhay, 47 Ta-xAs L. REv. 1, 26 (1968).
"Probatior" means the procedure under which an adult defendant, found guilty
of a crime upon verdict or plea, is released by the court without imprisonment
under a suspended or deferred sentence and subject to conditions. N.M. STATS.
ANN. § 41-47-14 (1953).
The first state to enact a probation law was Massachusetts in 1878. See Bassett,
Discretionary Power and Procedural Rights in the Granting and Revoking of Proba-
tion, 60 J. Cram. L.C. & P.S. 479, 480 n.11 (1969). The first federal law providing for
probation was The Federal Probation Act of 1925. See Roberts v. United States, 320
U.S. 264 (1943).
For figures on the increased utilization of probation by the courts see Hink, The
Application of Constitutional Standards of Protection to Probation 29 U. CGi. L. REv.
483, 486-87 (1962). For a detailed discussion of the probation process see Bassett, supra.;
Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59 CoLJM. L. REv. 311 (1959).
2 Of the jurisdictions with statutes providing for the right to a hearing upon revoca-
tion, few expressly provide for procedural and evidentiary rights to be accorded the
probationer during the hearing. See Ai.ASEA CODE CRim. PRoc. ANN. § 12.55.110 (1962)
(probationer entitled to counsel at revocation hearing); GA. CoDE ANN. § 27-2713 (Supp.
1970) (probationer may be heard in person or by counsel); IND. STATs. ANN. § 9-2211
(Burns Supp. 1970) (probationer entitled to counsel of his choice); MIcH. Com,. LAws
ANN. 5 771.4 (1967) (probationer entitled to a written copy of the charge against him);
N.Y. Cram. Paoc. LAw S 410.70 (McKinney 1971) (probationer may present evidence
on his behalf, may cross-examine witnesses, has right to counsel); NC. GEN. STATS.
S 15-200.1 (Supp. 1969) (probationer has right to counsel at hearing); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-2907 (Supp. 1970) (probationer has the right to counsel and the right to introduce
testimony on his own behalf).
In those jurisdictions without an express statutory provision on the probationers'
rights during a hearing, the courts are in conflict over the procedural and evidentiary
requirements to be employed. A majority of these jurisdictions have refused to hold
such safeguards applicable in all instances in the belief that probation revocation
hearings do not constitute criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 431
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One such safeguard has been the right to hearing prior to revocation of
probation.3
Revocation is not the sole means by which a court may alter a pro-
bationary period. Most jurisdictions have statutes permitting their courts
to extend the period of probation. 4 In a recent decision, Cook v. Com-
F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1970); Skidgell v. State, - Me. - , 264 A.2d 8 (1970); Knight v.
State, 7 Md. App. 313, 255 A.2d 441 (1969); Jaime v. Rhay, 59 Wash. 2d 58, 365 P.2d
772 (1961). A number of jurisdictions, however, have held that a probation revocation
hearing is a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., In re Collyar, 476 P.2d 354 (Okla. Grim.
1970); Fariss v. Tipps, 463 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1971); Campbell v. State, 456 S.W.2d 918
(Tex. Crim. 1970).
For a detailed discussion of the cases and statutes dealing with probation revocation
hearings see Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55
J. Cjam. L.C. & P.S. 175 (1964).
3 At present twenty-two jurisdictions expressly provide for a hearing upon probation
revocation. See ALA. CODE tit. 42, § 24 (1958); COLO. REv. STATs. ANN. § 39-16-9 (1963);
CoNN. GEN. STATS. ANN. § 54-114 (1959); DEL. CODE ANN. § 4335 (Supp. 1968); IDAIO
GEN. LAws ANN. § 20-222 (1947); ILL. ANN. STATS. ch. 38, § 117.3 (Smith-Hurd 1964);
IND. REv. STATs. ANN § 9-2211 (Burns Supp. 1970); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 439.300
(Baldwin 1962); MAINE REv. STATS. ANN. § 34-1633 (Supp. 1970); MicH. CoMp. LAws
ANN. § 771.4 (1967); MINN. STATS. ANN. § 609.14 (1964); MIss. CODE ANN. § 4004.25
(Supp. 1970); Mo. STATS. ANN. § 39-549.101 (Vernon Supp. 1970); MONT. REv. CODE
§ 94-9831 (1947); N.H. REv. STATS. ANN. § 504:4 (1953); N.J. STATS. ANN. § 2A:168-4
(1952); N.M. STATS. ANN. § 41-17-28.1 (1953); N.Y. CRiM. Paoc. LAw § 410.70 (Mc-
Kinney 1971); N.C. GEN. STATS. § 15-200 (Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §12-53-11
(Supp. 1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2907 (Supp. 1970); TExAs CODE Cim. PRoc. art.
42.12 (Vernon Supp. 1970).
Several jurisdictions, like Virginia, have statutes which would indicate that the pro-
bationer is to be accorded an opportunity to be heard before revocation. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1964) (". .. [Tihe probationer shall be taken before the court....");
FLA. STATS. ANN. § 948.06 (Supp. 1970) (probationer shall be given ". . . an opportunity
to be fully heard ... ."); HAWAII REv. STATS. § 711-80 (1965) (probationer is given an
opportunity to appear "...to show cause... ."); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 279 § 3 (1959)
(probationer shall be "... taken before the court. . . ."); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-19-9
(Supp. 1970) ("... . in open court, in the presence of the defendant, the court may
remove suspension .... ").
A number of jurisdictions have either failed to provide for any procedure upon
revocation, or have provided that it is to be left to the discretion of the court. Decisions
in several of these jurisdictions have recognized the right to a hearing upon revocation.
See, e.g., State v. Walter, 12 Ariz. App. 282, 469 P.2d 848 (1970); State v. Chesnut, 11
Utah 2d 142, 356 P.2d 36 (1960). In the absence of statute, California has refused to re-
quire a hearing upon revocation. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 263 Cal. App. 2d 818, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1968).
4 Thirty-six jurisdictions presently have statutes permitting their courts to extend
or modify the period of probation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964); ALA. CODE tit. 42, § 24
(1958); ALASKA CODE CRiM. PRoc. ANN. § 12.55.090 (1962); Aiuz. RFv. STATS. ANN.
§ 13-1657 (Supp. 1970); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2 (West Supp. 1971); CoLo. Rav. STATS.
ANN. § 39-16-9 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-113 (1959); DEL. CODE ANN. § 4334
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monwealth,5 Virginia became the first American jurisdiction to hold that
a probationer was entitled to a hearing before his probationary period
was extended.6 Through the extension of Cook's probationary period
(Supp. 1968); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-104 (1961); FLA. STATS. ANN. § 948.06 (Supp. 1970);
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2713 (Supp. 1970); IDAHO GEN. LAws ANN. § 20-222 (1947); ILL.
ANN. STATS. ch. 38, § 117.3 (Supp. 1971); IND. REV. STArs. ANN. § 9-2211 (Burns Supp.
1971); KANSAS STArs. ANN. § 21-4611 (Supp. 1970); Ky. REv. STATS. ANN. § 439.270
(Baldwin 1962); LA. REV. STATS. § 15:305 (1968); MD. CODE ANN. § 27-641A (1970);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 279 § 1A (1952); MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 771.5 (1967);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 4004-25 (Supp. 1970); NEv. REV. STATS. § 176.215 (1967); N.H. REv.
STATS. ANN. § 504:4 (1953); NJ. STATs. ANN. § 2A:168-4 (1952); N.Y. CumM. PROC. LAW
§ 410.20, 410.70 (McKinney 1971); N.C. GEN. STATS. § 15-200 (Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 12-53-17 (1960); OHnO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.07 (1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 12-19-13 (1956); S.C. CODE § 55-594 (1962); S.D. Comp. LAWS § 25-57-6 (1962); TEXAs
CODE Cium. PRoc. art. 42.12 (Vernon Supp. 1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953);
WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.95.230 (1964); Wis. STATS. ANN. § 57.01 (Supp. 1970); Wyo. STATS.
ANN. § 7-321 (1957).
5 211 Va. 290, 176 S.E.2d 815 (1970).
6Though the Cook decision is the first to hold that a hearing is required upon. pro-
bation extension, it is not the first decision to consider the question. See United States
v. Freeman, 160 F. Supp. 532 (D.D.C. 1957), aff'd on other grounds, 254 F.2d 352 (D.C.
Cir. 1958). The probationer was placed on probation on the condition that financial
restitution be made. Upon failing to make restitution within the time specified, the
probation period was extended without notice or a hearing. The court held that since
the applicable statute did not provide for a hearing upon extension, the probationer
was not denied any statutory rights. The court, however, went on to say:
The Court is now of the view that the extension of probationary periods in that
manner [without a hearing] constitutes an unwise practice and thus in the future
the Court will require appearances of probationers and counsel before extending
such periods. Id. at 534.
The court in Freeman noted, however, that this rule would not apply where the
probationer could not be located because of his failure to keep his probation officer
informed of his whereabouts. It is particularly interesting to note that the court also
excluded from this rule instances where the probationer has violated the laws of any
jurisdiction and as a result has been imprisoned. In Cook, the probation period was
extended because the probationer was imprisoned in another county charged with
forgery. See Cook v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 290, 291, 176 S.E.2d 815, 816 (1970).
It is unlikely then, that the rule in Freeman would have been applicable to the facts
in Cook.
See also Jesseph v. People, 164 Colo. 312, 435 P.2d 224 (1967). Here, again, the pro-
bation period was extended for failing to make restitution. In denying the right to
hearing upon extension the court stated:
While better practice dictates that a hearing be held before a probationary period
is extended, there is no constitutional requirement for such a hearing .... Nor
does the statute dealing with extensions of probation require such a hearing.
Id. at 313, 435 P.2d at 225.
The court did hold, however, that the period of probation could not be revoked for
a violation subsequent to the extension order where the probationer had not, at the
time of the violation, received notice of the extension.
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the trial court was subsequently able to revoke his probation at a date
beyond its original period of expiration.7 Cook was afforded neither no-
tice or a hearing before the extension. The Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals held that although section 53-273, s of the Code of Virginia, pro-
viding for extension of probation, did not call for a hearing before ex-
tension, "fundamental fairness" required that a judicial hearing of a sum-
mary nature be granted.9
The true dimensions of Cook must be considered in light of those
statutes and decisions dealing with probation revocation. In Slayton v.
Cormnownwealth,10 the Virginia court used the same rule of "fundamental
fairness" in holding that section 53-27 5 of the Code of Virginia, the revo-
In those few cases that have dealt with probation extensions, the majority have in-
volved extensions made in the presence of the defendant. These decisions have not
elaborated on the right to a hearing upon extension. See, e.g., United States v. Squillante,
235 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v. Rosner, 161 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
People v. Arguello, - Cal. App. 2d - 27 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1963); Lanham v. Common-
wealth, 353 S.W.2d 201 (Ky. 1962); State v. Triplett, 10 N.C. App. 165, 178 S.E.2d 38
(1970); Jaime v. Rhay, 59 Wash. 2d 58, 365 P.2d 772 (1961). But see Holdren v.
People, - Colo. - , 452 P.2d 28 (1969), where the court held that a probationer has no
statutory or constitutional right to a hearing upon extension of his probationary period.
7 The trial court, upon being informed that the probationer was confined in jail in
another county charged with forgery, entered an order extending his period of proba-
tion for one year. The order was issued on July 26, 1968, the day of expiration of the
probation period. The probationer was subsequently convicted of the forgeries on
August 20, 1968. On the basis of the conviction, the suspended sentence was revoked
pursuant to a hearing on September 6, 1968. See Cook v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 290,
291, 176 S.E.2d 815, 816 (1970).
8 "The court may subsequently increase or decrease the probation period and may
revoke or modify any condition of probation." VA. CODE ANN. § 53-273 (1967).
9 The court stated:
... [Flundamental fairness requires a judicial hearing of a summary nature for
the probation period to be extended, since increasing the period of probation
has the effect of extending the restraints on the probationer's liberty which are
normally incident to his probation and extends the time period during which
revocation may occur. 211 Va. at 292, 176 S.E.2d at 817-18.
In light of the peculiar factual situation present, the court's ruling is not a surprising
one. See note 7 supra. The obvious motive behind the extension was to enable the
trial court to retain control over the probationer until a revocation hearing could be
held. The above passage from the court's opinion is evidence of the fact that it was
influenced by the subsequent revocation. The court's treatment of section 53-273 in
conjunction with section 53-275, dealing with probation revocation, indicates that it
was aware of the fact that under the latter section the trial court would have been
unable to revoke the probation subsequent to termination of the period. See 211 Va.
at 292, 176 S.E.2d at 817-18.
10 185 Va. 357, 38 S.E.2d 479 (1946).
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cation statute, required a judicial hearing before probation revocation."
In Slayton the court had little difficulty finding that a judicial hearing
was "implicit" in the revocation statute in view of the fact that the stat-
ute specified that upon revocation the probationer was to be "... . brought
before the court... ." 11 It is significant that section 53-273 makes no such
provision. The statute merely states, without elaboration, that the court
may increase or decrease the period of probation.'3
Though the complexity and volume of the various probation statutes
has rapidly expanded, few jurisdictions have established procedural safe-
guards for probation extension, either through legislative enactment or
judicial construction. 14 It is these factors, however, that make the Cook
decision potentially one of the most significant rulings to date in the area
of probation.
At present the majority of American jurisdictions, adhering to the no-
tion that probation is not a matter of right, but a privilege, have re-
11 The rule of "fundamental fairness" is not apparent on the face of the court's
opinion in Slayton. The court merely stated that since revocation of probation deprives
"the probationer of his liberty, he is entitled to a judicial hearing. See Slayton v. Com-
monwealth, 185 Va. 357, 366, 38 S.E.2d 479, 483 (1946). The rule of "fundamental
fairness," however, appears to be the basis for the holding in Slayton, though not ex-
pressly set out in the opinion. It was the Cook decision only that made express reference
td the rule. See Cook v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 290, 292, 176 S.E.2d 815, 817 (1970).
12 Virginia Acts of Assembly 1938, ch. 122, at 188 (now VA. CODE ANN. 53-275 ( Cum.
Supp. 1970)).
The "explicit" construction is not that of Slayton, but is the court's interpretation. of
that opinion in Cook. See Cook v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 290, 292, 176 S.E.2d 815,
817 (1970).
13 See note 8 supra.
14 By far the most liberal probation modification statute now in force is contained in
New York's new Criminal Procedure Law, effective September 1, 1971. See N.Y. CRIM.
PRoc. LAw § 410.701 (McKinney 1971). The statute provides for a hearing, cross-ex-
amination of witnesses by the defendant, presentation of evidence by the defendant
in his own behalf, and the right to counsel before any modification of the probation
period.
At present, no other jurisdiction has a statute expressly providing for procedure upon
extension of probation. A few states, however, do have statutes which indicate that a
hearing might be required upon extension. A lack of judicial construction of these
statutes makes it impossible to predict how future decisions will hold. See FLA. STATS.
ANN. § 948.06 (Supp. 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2713 (Supp. 1970); N.H. REv. STATs.
ANN. § 504.4 (1953). See cases cited note 6 supra.
15 See, e.g., Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935); Holdren v. People, - Colo. -, 452
P.2d 28 (1969); Davis v. State, - Ind. -, 267 N.E.2d 63 (1971); Dobs v. State, 47 Wis.
2d 20, 176 N.W.2d 289 (1970). But see Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th
Cir. 1969). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted: 'We are not impressed
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fused to hold procedural due process applicable to probation revoca-
tion."' These jurisdictions have permitted their trial courts to exercise
broad discretion in all phases of probation. It now appears, however,
by the argument that probation is a 'mere' privilege . . . rather than a right ... " Id.
at 1322.
Using similar expressions other courts have noted that probation is an act of grace,
clemency or mercy. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp.
648 (ED. La. 1970); United States v. Longknife, 258 F. Supp. 303 (D. Hawaii 1966);
State v. Walter, 12 Ariz. App. 282, 469 P.2d 848 (1970); Martin v. State, 243 So. 2d
189 (Fla. App. 1971); Skidgell v. State, - Me. - , 264 A.2d 8 (1970); State v. Follis,
81 N.M. 690, 472 P.2d 655 (1970). But see State v. Duitsman, 186 Neb. 39, 180 N.W.2d
685 (1970). The court, recognizing that probation is primarily rehabilitative in nature,
refused to adhere to ". . . the archaic notion that probation constituted merely an act
of clemency or mercy." Id. at 686.
The question has been raised as to whether probation is really to be considered a
privilege; that since one convicted of a crime must choose between the threat of a
long, indeterminate sentence and probation he really has no choice at all. See Hink,
supra note 1, at 495. For further arguments against the concept that probation is a
privilege see Bassett, supra note 1, at 289-91.
16 See, e.g., Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935); Martin v. State, - Ala. Crim. -
241 So. 2d 339 (1970); People v. Valdespino, - Cal. App. 3d - , 93 Cal. Rptr. 142
(1971); Skidgell v. State, - Me. - , 264 A.2d 8 (1970); In re Collyar, 476 P.2d 354
(Okla. Crim. 1970). Cf. United States v. Bryant, 431 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1970). A num-
ber of recent decisions, however, indicate that the present trend may be toward holding
procedural due process applicable to probation revocation. See, e.g., Hahn v. Burke,
430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970); Edwardsen v. Petersen, 319 F. Supp. 1338 (ED. Wis. 1970);
Hamrick v. Boles, 231 F. Supp. 507 (ND. W.Va. 1964); People v. Bacon, 124 IM. App.
2d 262, 260 N.E.2d 357 (1970); State v. Atkinson, 7 N.C. App. 355, 172 S.E.2d 249 (1970);
State v. Shannon, 60 Wash. 2d 883, 376 P.2d 646 (1962).
The focal point of the controversy over the constitutional right to counsel at a revo-
cation hearing has been the case of Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). Mempa held
that a probationer was entitled to counsel at a revocation hearing. A majority of
American jurisdictions, however, have held this ruling applicable only to probation
granted through the deferred sentencing procedure, rather than the suspended sentence.
See, e.g., Shaw v. Henderson, 430 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1970); State ex rel. Robinson v.
Henderson, 257 La. 179, 241 So. 2d 762 (1970); Petition of Brittingham, - Mont. - ,
473 P.2d 830 (1970); State v. Shawyer, - W.Va. - , 177 S.E.2d 25 (1970). A number
of decisions, on the other hand, have extended Mempa to both suspended and deferred
sentencing. See, e.g., Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969); Ashworth
v. United States, 391 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1968); Scarpelli v. Gagnon, 317 F. Supp. 72
(E.D. Wis. 1970); State v. Atkinson, 7 N.C. App. 355, 172 S.E.2d 249 (1970); Ex parte
Bird, 457 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Crim. 1970).
For a discussion of Mempa and arguments in favor of the extended view see Cohen,
supra note 1, at 1; Note, Right to Counsel Extended to Include Probation Revocation
Hearings, 18 KAN. L. REv. 686 (1970).
17See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932); United States v. Clanton, 419
F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648
(E.D. La. 1970); Gross v. State, 240 Ark. 926, 403 S.W.2d 75 (1966); People v. Smith,
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that the trend may be turning toward applying due process requirements
to probation revocation. 8 Recent United States Supreme Court decisions
have undermined the privilege-right distinction 9 to the point where it
has been considered, by at least one court, as no longer a basis for deny-
ing due process considerations in probation revocation.20
12 Cal. App. 3d 621, 90 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1970); People v. Williams, - Ill. App. 2d - , 264
N.E.2d 589 (1970); Davis v. State, - Ind. - , 267 N.E.2d 63 (1971); State v. Frye, -
Ore. App. - , 465 P.2d 736 (1970). Most jurisdictions have placed some restrictions on
the discretion to be exercised by trial courts in dealing with probation. See, e.g.,
Parker v. Laws, - Ark. - , 460 S.W.2d 337 (1970) (the court may not require the
accused to make cash payments as a condition of probation); People v. Ledford, - Colo.
- , 477 P.2d 374 (1970) (confinement may not be imposed as a condition of probation.
lB See, e.g, Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970); Hewett v. North Carolina,
415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969); Ashworth v. United States, 391 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1968);
Scarpelli v. Gagnon, 317 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
In Cook, the Commonwealth used the Hewett decision as authority for the proposi-
tion that a non-sentencing revocation proceeding is not a stage of the trial at which
Mempa would be applicable. See Brief for Commonwealth at 10, Cook v. Common-
wealth, 211 Va. 290, 176 S.E.2d 815 (1970). A reading of Hewett discloses that the
holding in the decision was clearly that revocation of probation is a stage of the
criminal proceeding to which Mempa would apply. See Hewett v. North Carolina,
supra at 1322.
19 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In the Goldberg decision the Court
held that a New York City resident who received financial aid under a federally as-
sisted aid program was denied due process of law when the aid was terminated without
prior notice and a hearing. The Court stated:
Their termination [the federal benefits) involves state action that adjudicates
important rights. The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argu-
ment that public assistance benefits are a "privilege" and not a "right." 397 U.S.
at 262.
The Court went on to quote from a concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951). The
Court noted that:
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient [of
financial aid] is influenced by the extent to which he may be condemned to suffer
grevious loss,' .. . and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding
that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication. 397 U.S.
at 262-63.
In light of the Court's and Justice Frankfurter's remarks it is difficult to see how the
conflict between Goldberg and Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935), holding procedural
due process not applicable to probation revocation, can be reconciled; for there are
few losses more grievous than the loss of one's freedom upon revocation of his proba-
tionary period.
For an excellent discussion of this subject see Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
20In Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970), the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, recognizing that the privilege-right distinction was no longer a valid
basis for denying procedural due process upon probation revocation, sought to recQn-
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Because probation extension, unlike revocation, does not result in any
greater restraints than those already imposed on the probationer, it is un-
likely that future decisions will hold due process safeguards applicable.21
The Cook ruling, however, is consistent with the trend away from the
privilege-right distinction. Because probation extension results in con-
tinued restraints on the probationer's liberty and prolongs his exposure
to subsequent revocation, courts in the future will find it difficult to rec-
oncile application of due process to probation revocation while denying
that fundamental fairness warrants a hearing upon probation extension.
Irrespective of the due process considerations involved, the practical
consequences of Cook are far-reaching. Probation is clearly reformatory
in nature,22 and if social rehabilitation is to be achieved through the use
of probation, the probationer must be assured that he will receive fair,
consistent and straightforward treatment.2 The degree of flexibility and
predictability to be achieved through the use of a hearing before any
alteration in the period of probation is obviously far more conducive to
rehabilitation than subjecting the probationer to the boundless discretion
of the court. D.E.E.
cile the conflict between Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935), and Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970). The court of appeals noted that in Escoe, the Court, though
denying a constitutional right to a hearing upon revocation, went on to grant the pro-
bationer a hearing as required by statute. The court interpreted this to indicate that the
remarks concerning the constitutional right to a hearing in Escoe were only dicta; that
the Court's opinion was based on a statutory right, and so did not constitute a "binding
precedented rejection of such a constitutional right." Hahn v. Burke, supra at 105. See
also Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969).
21 Even if the principals set out in Goldberg were to become the basis for holding
procedural due process applicable to probation revocation, it is unlikely that probation
extension would be considered a "grievous loss" to the probationer so as to bring it
within the purview of that decision.
22 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970);
United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. La. 1970); State v.
Hennessy, 13 Ariz. 546, 479 P.2d 194 (1971); State v. Saavedra, 5 Conn. Cir. 367, 253
A.2d 677 (1968); Belden v. Hugo, 88 Conn. 500, 91 A. 369 (1914); People v. Thomas, -
Ill. App. 2d -, 257 N.E.2d 480 (1970).
The reformatory nature of probation was recognized as early as the Belden decision
where the court stated:
[Probation] is not ordered for the purpose of punishment for the wrong for
which there has been a conviction, or for general wrongdoing. Its aim is re-
formatory and not punitive. It is to bring one who has fallen into evil ways
under oversight and influences which may lead him to a better living. 88 Conn.
at 504, 91 A. at 370.
2a See, e.g., State v. Walter, 12 Ariz. App. 282, 469 P.2d 848 (1970) (concurring
opinion); State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044 (1927); Hink, supra note 1, at
497.
